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Segregated Schools: Explaining 
the U-Shaped Pattern 
Relative (black-to-white) per pupil expenditures in southern public schools 
followed a U-shaped pattern over time: an initial period of relative similarity 
in the late nineteenth century, followed by a pronounced shift towards inequal- 
ity around the turn of the century that persisted for forty years, and then a 
trend towards equalization in the 1940s. The initial deterioration in the rela- 
tive quality of the black schools was a consequence of widespread disenfran- 
chisement of  blacks and of  growth in demand for better white schools. Al- 
though there were incentives and institutions that ensured that public funds 
would continue to flow to the black schools after disenfranchisement, these 
forces were not sufficient to eliminate the gap in school spending. Rather, the 
trend towards equalization in the 1940s only took place as the consequence of 
a concerted legal effort, in the context of changed social, political, and eco- 
nomic circumstances. 
3.1  The Disenfranchisement Hypothesis 
Between 1890 and 1910 per pupil expenditures in southern black schools 
fell relative to per pupil expenditures in white schools. Most scholars attribute 
the decline to two factors.' One, southern blacks lost political clout in the late 
nineteenth century and with it, influence over how school revenues were allo- 
cated. -0, the demand for better white schools increased after the turn of the 
century. This demand was met by a combination  of higher school budgets and, 
in some cases, by shifting resources away from the black schools. 
The history of voting rights in the postbellum South is a sorry tale.2  During 
Reconstruction (1866-77),  southern blacks enjoyed a modicum of political 
power  under  Republican governments established after the Civil War  and 
maintained by  a federal military presence. Funds for social services were 
greatly increased or provided for the first time, such as public schools for 
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black children. Blacks were elected to public office, and served in many state 
and local capacities. Taxes to pay for the expansion in government spending 
fell largely on the ex-slaveholding  planter class. 
With the end of  Reconstruction the political clout of  blacks, and that of 
poor whites as well, suffered a reversal. Reconstruction governments were 
replaced by Redeemers, southern Democrats intent on restoring the political 
supremacy of the white elite. State budgets were reduced and services, partic- 
ularly education, were cut back. Laws were amended to allow the state gov- 
ernment to appoint local officials, who previously had to be elected to office. 
Whomever controlled the  state government-and  the  Redeemers were  in 
command-controlled  the distribution of  government spending at the local 
level. Through a combination of  intimidation, violence, and outright fraud, 
the influence of black voters was reduced. Formal disenfranchisement, in the 
sense of laws that deliberately restricted the franchise, would come later. The 
Redeemers feared that such legislation would invite a second Reconstruction, 
and so settled for informal means of curtailing voting rights. 
Key (1949, 533) argued that the informal means were so successful that 
disenfranchisement  was a fuit uccompli by the time suffrage restrictions were 
formally enacted. An important book by Morgan Kousser (1974) shows, how- 
ever, that Democratic hegemony was far more precariously based. Pockets of 
Republican strength survived and occasionally flourished after Reconstruc- 
tion, and the possibility that the Republican (or another opposition) party 
might return to office still existed. 
The possibility nearly became reality with the Populist revolt of the 1890s. 
The rise of Populism had many causes, but there is no doubt that a key factor 
was the devastating economic downturn of  the early 1890s. Populist candi- 
dates attempted to register poor white and black voters, included members of 
both groups on party slates, and generally sought to redistribute political and 
economic power away from Redeemers and their supporters. 
To combat the Populist menace, Democrats resorted to the same methods 
they used  in the  1880s-violence,  race-baiting, and fraud-only  this time 
they followed up by enacting suffrage restrictions into law. The restrictions 
did not take the form of explicitly prohibiting the right to vote on the basis of 
race or party affiliation, although some came very close. Frequently the right 
to vote was made conditional on literacy, property ownership, residency, or 
payment of a poll tax.) A person might have to demonstrate his ability to read 
and write by passing a test administered  by a local official. Aside from the fact 
that the official determined who passed the test, near-illiterates never bothered 
to try, not wishing to reveal their ignorance publicly. A Louisiana law allowed 
illiterates to register if  they owned at least $300 worth of  taxable wealth, a 
sizable amount. Other states made registration conditional on residency in an 
area for a year or longer, which was difficult or impossible for farm laborers. 
The poll tax was usually a nominal sum, but it might have to be paid at a time 35  The Political Economy of Segregated Schools 
and place different from voter registration. If  the registree had  neglected to 
pay the tax in previous years, the tax due would be cumulative. To ensure the 
laws would not cut too heavily into the white electorate, “grandfather”  clauses 
were enacted which exempted ex-Confederates from meeting certain require- 
ments provided that they registered within a grace period. 
The effect of  suffrage restrictions was, nevertheless, to curtail voting by 
poor whites and virtually decimate the black ele~torate.~  Overall, white turn- 
out declined by 26 percent and black turnout by 62 percent, comparing guber- 
natorial and presidential elections before and after suffrage restrictions were 
enacted (Kousser 1974, 240).5  The “Solid South” was the product of deliber- 
ate actions aimed at restricting the size of  the electorate.and its racial and 
economic composition. 
Equally deliberate were the consequences of disenfranchisement for the ra- 
cial distribution of  public expenditures. “At the  same time” that political 
rights were being abridged, “southern state and local governments increased 
their discrimination against blacks in the only important service those govern- 
ments provided-education.  . . . Discrimination in voting, in other words, 
paralleled discrimination in government services, a condition unlikely to have 
been coincidental” (228-29). 
The effects of disenfranchisement  on school spending, however, were more 
complex than a pure redistribution of school revenues from blacks to whites. 
The story can be told with the aid of a simple model. Imagine that the prefer- 
ences (V)  of a typical adult white can be summarized by the following equa- 
tion: 
(1)  V = V(e,, Y - pz) 
Y is the person’s income, e, is spending per white pupil, z is school budget 
per pupil, and p is the fraction of the financing of the school budget borne by 
whites. Spending per white pupil is related to spending per black pupil (e,) 
via the school board’s budget constraint: 
(2)  e,6  + eb(l -  6) = z = s + t 
6 is the proportion of  pupils who were white; and in per pupil terms, the 
school board budget, z,  consists of  state school funds, s,  and local school 
taxes, t. Equation (2) can be rewritten to show the dependence of e, on eb: 
(3)  e, = zl6 - [l - 6)/6le, 
Differentiating with respect to z and setting the result equal to zero gives the 
individual’s preferred level of the school budget, z*, which solves 
(4)  V,lV* = pla 
Here ci  = de,/dz, the fraction of  a one-dollar increase in  the school budget 
going to the white schools (the subscripts in [4] are partial derivatives). The 36  Chapter Three 
left-hand side of (4) is the individual’s demand curve for expenditures in the 
white schools, e,.  The right-hand side is the “price” of raising white school 
spending, that is, the burden on whites of an increase in the budget divided by 
the  fraction of  the  increase going  to  white  schools.  Disenfranchisement 
caused the “price” of white schooling, p/a,  to decline, and thus the demand 
for e,  rose. 
Only part of  the increase in white per pupil expenditures from  1890 to 
1910, however, was a pure redistribution from black to white schools from a 
fixed “pie,” that is, with a constant level of z.  Consider the case of Mississippi. 
Between 1890 and 1910 real expenditures per black pupil in Mississippi fell, 
on average, by $1  .60 (see Table 2.6). In 1890 55 percent of the children at- 
tending Mississippi’s public schools were black. Using equation (3), such a 
decline in black spending would cause an increase in average white spending 
of $1.96 (= 1.60 X  [0.55/0.45]), holding z constant. The actual increase in 
white per pupil spending in Mississippi between 1890 and  1910 was $9.26 
(see Table 2.6). Thus redistribution of school revenues from blacks to whites 
accounts for 21 percent (= 1.96/9.26) of the increase in white expenditures 
in Mississippi. Similar results were obtained for the other states. 
The rise in white per pupil expenditures between 1890 and 1910 was facil- 
itated by  institutional changes in school finance in the context of rising de- 
mand for better white schools. Growing demand and the concomitant institu- 
tional  changes,  which  were  coincident with  disenfranchisement, led  to 
increases in school budgets, frequently through the levying of  local school 
property taxes. Prior to disenfranchisement, some southern states constitu- 
tionally limited or even prohibited the levying of  local school taxes at the 
discretion of  the electorate. Wealthy white landlords argued against local 
school taxes because they themselves bore, or so they believed, most of the 
cost and personally received few benefits. But, as long as the black and white 
schools received roughly equal per pupil allocations, many middle-class white 
parents, too, were opposed to higher school taxes because they, as a group, 
owned much more taxable wealth than blacks (Higgs 1982; Margo 1984a). A 
superintendent of  Oconee County, Georgia thought it was wrong to “tax the 
whites to educate the blacks. This has made a skeleton of  what otherwise 
would have been a corpulent and muscular man [the school system]” (US. 
Bureau of Education 1893, 1079). The state superintendent  of North Carolina 
noted there was “much opposition to public schools in the State . . . because 
of the small amount of  taxes paid by the negroes” (ibid.). Alabama’s superin- 
tendent claimed that “in portions of the State the colored race gets well-nigh 
all the school fund, whilst that race pays a very small per cent of the taxes that 
make up that fund” (1075). The superintendent of Tipton County, Tennessee, 
bristled: 
There seems nothing at present that promises to discourage the advance- 
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disposition on the part of the white people of the county, who pay ninety- 
five one-hundredths of the taxes, to discontinue the public education of the 
“brother in black” who, notwithstanding the fact that he pays less than five 
one-hundredths of the taxes of our county, receives more than 50 percent of 
the public-school moneys. This, the white people argue, is wrong, and 
should be remedied; and I heartily agree with them . . . the negro should 
bear the burden of his own education. (1893, 1080-8 1) 
Eliminating blacks from the electorate removed this “obstacle” to white 
educational progress.6 It is no accident that state constitutions-Alabama, 
Louisiana, and North Carolina are examples-were  amended after disenfran- 
chisement to permit the levying of school taxes. It is also no accident that the 
“black balance of payments’’-the  amount blacks received in school expend- 
itures less the black share of the school tax burden-declined  after disenfran- 
chisement (Smith 1973; Kousser 1980a).’ 
Not every county chose to increase expenditures on white schools by levy- 
ing local school taxes, however. In some cases redistribution from blacks to 
whites was more profitable. Counties in which the black population share was 
high-the  “black be!t”-did  not need  higher local taxes to finance better 
white schools. If the Slack population share was 75 percent, every dollar di- 
verted from the black schools yielded three dollars of additional spending per 
white pupil; at 90 percent, the rate of return was ten dollars for every dollar 
diverted (see eq. [2]). State school funds were typically allocated to counties 
on the basis of the total school age population (or enrollment or attendance) in 
the county; the funds were distributed to district sclmol boards which had 
considerable discretion in how to spend the money. Black children had a “cash 
value” to local school boards because each was worth a certain amount of state 
educational aid (Bond 1934; Myrdal 1944, 341). In black-belt counties the 
total amount of  state funds might be enough to support a good school for 
white children (who were relatively few in number) without local taxes, or at 
least ease the local tax burden on white property owners. “I have a local . . . 
tax in seven of ten wards,” explained the superintendent of Caldwell parish in 
Louisiana. “In the three wards where there is no tax the principal population 
is colored and the whites in these wards have all the money they want to run 
the white schools” (State of Louisiana 1907, 60). 
In poor, predominantly white counties, growth in school budgets was heav- 
ily dependent on state aid. State school funds typically were derived from 
taxes, legislative appropriations, interest on public lands, and miscellaneous 
sources; as a fraction of school budgets, their importance declined after disen- 
franchisement. Poor whites lacked the taxable wealth to finance better schools 
on their own (many were disenfranchised themselves); and, in any case, they 
needed their children to work on the family farm or in the labor market. Di- 
senfranchisement led not only to a gap between white and black per pupil 
expenditures, but to greater inequality among whites as well  (Bond 1934, 
1939; Harlan 1958; Kousser 1980a). 38  Chapter Three 
3.2  Race, Politics, and Educational Change: A Case Study of 
Louisiana, 1880 to 1910 
In this section many of the points just made are pursued in greater detail in 
an econometric analysis of the effects of disenfranchisement  on school spend- 
ing in Louisiana between 1880 and 1910.*  To the best of my knowledge, Loui- 
siana was the only southern state to publish race-specific figures on voter reg- 
istration. Although the voter registration data are known to be flawed, they 
still reveal the deleterious effect that disenfranchisement  had on expenditures 
in Louisiana’s black schools. 
The Democratic party returned to power in Louisiana at the end of Recon- 
struction. One of the first acts of the “Bourbons” was to reduce the size of the 
state school fund. According to Hair (1969, 60) the brunt of the decline fell 
on the state’s fledgling schools for black children, which had been established 
in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.  Statistics for 1879 confirm that 
the black schools were less well funded than the white schools. On average, 
expenditures per black pupil enrolled equalled 67 cents for every dollar spent 
per white pupil.g 
Throughout the  1880s the Bourbons remained in  power by  exercising a 
level of election fraud virtually unmatched in the annals of American politics. 
In areas controlled by the Democratic party, such as the black-belt cotton par- 
ishes in  the northern part of the state, ballot boxes were stuffed and votes 
thrown out or deliberately falsified. “We all admit that when it comes to our 
elections ,” declared black-belt Democrat Robert Snyder to the state legislature 
in 1890, “we suspend the law until the danger is passed” (Kousser 1974, 153). 
A former Republican governor during Reconstruction lamented that “after the 
polls are closed” in Louisiana, “the election really begins” (ibid.). 
Most egregious was the practice of maintaining blacks on the registration 
rolls long after they left a parish, or this life. “A dead darkey,” as the saying 
went, “always makes a good Democrat and never ceases to vote” (Hair 1969, 
115). The reason for overstating the number of black registrees was that the 
size of a parish’s delegation to the Democratic party’s nominating conventions 
(held for the purpose of filling state-appointed  positions, such as local school 
boards) depended on the Democratic count in prior elections.*O  By  inflating 
the returns, black-belt Democrats ensured their control over the state machine. 
“Only in the sugar-growing  regions of  South Louisiana where some influential 
Republican planters lived, were black men free to vote for more than one 
party” (  1  13). 
The Populist revolt hit Louisiana in the early 1890s, and by  1894 the threat 
was too large for the Bourbons to ignore. In that year the Bourbon-controlled 
state legislature passed literacy and property qualifications for the franchise, 
but the Populist outcry against the restrictions was so vociferous that the Dem- 
ocratic governor decided it was best to settle the issue by  a referendum at- 
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Populists had “fused” with the Republican party. The Republican nominee for 
governor was John Pharr, a wealthy sugar planter. 
The Populists were successful in stirring up black support for Pharr. Blacks 
“who had not attempted to vote in a dozen years” tried to register. In Opelou- 
sas, Louisiana, “the registrar . . . kept himself locked in jail to avoid the 
crowds of blacks who clamored to be added to the rolls.” Even in the black- 
belt cotton parishes, wealthy Democratic landlords had “an unusual amount 
of  difficulty . . . discouraging Negro participation in the approaching elec- 
tion” (1969, 237-38,  259). 
Despite the surge in black support, Pharr lost by 2,000 votes. Analysis of 
voting returns shows that the Democrats stole the governor’s office. In several 
predominantly black parishes, Pharr rolled up only a handful of votes, despite 
his  known  popularity with  black  voters (Kousser  1974,  157). Black-belt 
whites continued the practice of fraudulently stuffing the ballot box for their 
candidate. Yet  the Populist threat had  not vanished, for the referendum to 
restrict the franchise was soundly defeated. The fusion ticket had captured 
numerous seats in the stage legislature, fraud notwithstanding, and was threat- 
ening a recount in the governor’s election. 
In the end the Democrats prevailed. The recount resolution was repealed 
and enough legislative support was mustered to enact a new voter registration 
statute. The effect of the new law was to reduce black voter registration by 90 
percent (1974, 163). When a convention was suggested to enshrine the suf- 
frage restrictions in a new state constitution, the voters, now much reduced in 
number, approved. 
In addition tv the suffrage restrictions, the state constitution of  1898 con- 
tained one other change of significance. For the first time, state law permitted 
voters in a school district to vote local school property taxes. The joker was 
that those who would impose the taxes on themselves and others had to meet 
the new literacy and property requirements for the franchise. 
Figure 3.1 shows the trend in public school revenue per pupil enrolled (in 
constant 1910-14  dollars) in Louisiana from 1886 to 1910. Prior to the 1898 
constitution, parish school budgets primarily consisted of  state aid that was 
allocated to them on the basis of  the school-age population, independent of 
race; poll taxes on adult males; and the “police-jury” appropriation, a portion 
of general parish revenues (derived from a parish-wide property tax) allocated 
to the schools. The per pupil budget rose from the mid-1880s to 1896, before 
falling sharply in the wake of a severe agricultural downturn that gripped the 
state late in the decade. Budgets recovered in the early years of the century to 
their mid-1890s level, but it was  not until after 1904 that school revenues 
increased substantially. The increase was partly a consequence of higher state 
allocations, but it was mostly due to an increase in police-jury allocations and, 
especially, the local property taxes authorized by the 1898 constitution. Be- 
tween 1898 and 1904, 114 school districts opted for the local tax. By  1910 
the number had increased to 1,200. 40  Chapter Three 






1886  1888  1890  1892  1894  1896  1898  1900  1902  1904  1906  1908  1910 
Year 
Figure 3.1  Public School Finance in Louisiana, 1886-1910 
Notes: A circle indicates the total school budget per pupil enrolled; a square indicates the 
amount of state educational aid per pupil enrolled. All figures are in 1910-14  dollars; deflator is 
Warren-Pearson wholesale price index (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). 
Source: Calculated from state school superintendent’s  reports (State of Louisiana 1887-1912a). 
Figure 3.2 graphs expenditures on teacher salaries per pupil enrolled, by 
race, over the same period. Unlike the situation in some other states (for ex- 
ample, Alabama or North Carolina), in Louisiana expenditures per white pu- 
pil exceeded spending per black pupil throughout the late nineteenth century. 
Yet  it is also clear that expenditures per black pupil were rising prior to 1896 
as the per pupil budget was increasing. Furthermore, there was an upturn in 
the black-white expenditure ratio in  1895-96,  at the height of  the Populist 
threat (see Figure 3.3). It was only after the threat had  passed that a pro- 
nounced decline in the black-to-white ratio of per pupil expenditures would 
commence. In 1896 the expenditure ratio stood at 0.4 for the state as a whole. 
In 1902, when the per pupil budget was only slightly higher than in 1896, the 
expenditure ratio was 0.3. After 1902, school budgets increased substantially, 
and it is obvious from the graphs that all, or virtually all, of the increase went 
to the white schools. 
But the graphs do not tell the full story. One cannot read off them precisely 
what the numerical significance of disenfranchisement was. I have therefore 
estimated a cross-sectional county-level regression of  the black-to-white ex- 
penditure ratio (BWEXP). The independent variables are the percentage of 
blacks in the county (%BK), the per pupil budget (PPB), and the percentage 41  The Political Economy of  Segregated Schools 
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Figure 3.2  Expenditures on Teachers Salaries Per Pupil Enrolled: Louisiana 
Public Schools, 1886-1910 
Notes: Expenditures are in 1910-14  dollars; deflator is Warren-Pearson wholesale price index 
(U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975). For 1886 to 1903, expenditures were estimated by 
multiplying the average monthly teacher salary times the length of  the school year in months 
times the number of teachers per pupil enrolled. 
Source: See Figure 3.1. 
of  registered voters who  were black  interacted with  the per pupil  budget 
(%BKV x PPB).  The hypothesis is that black political clout ensured that the 
black schools would receive a share of any increase in school budgets. Thus 
the coefficient of the interaction term is predicted to be positive, although the 
coefficient of the per pupil budget could be negative. Data for 1896 were used 
to estimate the regression because, as the previous discussion suggests, it was 
in this year that the threat to Democratic rule reached its peak.  The variables 
BWEXP  and PPB  are in logs; %BK and %BKV are shares between 0 and 1. 
The results are 
BWEXP = 1.21 -  3.60 %BK -  0.72 PPB + 0.47 PPB X  %BKV 
(2.84)  (5.65)  (2.54)  (1.30) 
N  = 57, R2 = 0.55 
Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
The results support the disenfranchisement hypothesis. The coefficient of 
the interaction term is positive as predicted and  statistically significant at 








Source: See Figure 3.1. 
Black-to-White Ratio of Per Pupil Expenditures: Louisiana, 1886- 
negative, large, and statistically significant. Were it not for the potential threat 
the black vote represented, increases in school budgets would have gone much 
more heavily to the white schools (recall from Fig. 3.2 that expenditures per 
black pupil rose just prior to 1896).  l1 
Between 1896 and 1910 the black share of  registered voters in Louisiana 
declined by 49 percentage points and, in log terms, the per pupil school bud- 
get rose by 0.69. According to the regression, these changes would predict a 
decrease in BWEXP of 0.16 (= 0.47  X  0.69  X  0.49). The actual decrease 
in BWEXP between 1896 and 1910 was 0.703 (in logs). The disappearance 
of  blacks from the registration rolls accounts for 23 percent ( = 0.16/0.70) 
of the decrease in the black-to-white ratio of per pupil expenditures. 
This  measure  of  the  impact  of  disenfranchisement, however,  is biased 
downwards for two reasons. First, because the registration data are known to 
be  measured with error (black-belt fraud), the coefficient of  the interaction 
term is biased towards zero in absolute value.'* Second, it was after 1904 that 
school budgets began to rise significantly, yet only 10 percent of the increase 
in the per pupil budget between  1904 and  1910 was  due to a rise in state 
educational funds. The rest was raised locally, primarily through increased 
allocations by police juries and the voting of local school taxes. The expan- 43  The Political Economy of Segregated Schools 
Table 3.1  Regressions of Per Pupil Budgets: Louisiana, 1890 and 1910 
1890  1910 
P  t-statistic  P  t-statistic 
Constant  1.30  8.50  2.98  28.40 
Percentage black of  enrollments  -0.25  -  1.24  -0.48  -  2.09 
Adult males per pupil enrolled  0.76  3.68  0.16  1.05 
Assessed wealth per pupil enrolled  0.28  1.59  0.43  3.36 
Number  of observations  53 
R2  0.71 
54 
0.49 
Note: Dependent variable is log of  school budget per  pupil enrolled. 
Sources: School budget and enrollments: State of  Louisiana (1890, 1910); adult males:  U.S. 
Census Office (1895), U.S.  Bureau of  the Census (1913); assessed wealth:  State of  Louisiana 
(1892b, 1912h). 
sion of  local school revenues took place after disenfranchisement in Loui- 
siana. 
Further evidence on school revenues is shown in Table 3.1, which contains 
cross-sectional, county-level regressions of  per pupil budgets for 1890 and 
1910. In 1890 the number of adult males per child (the poll tax) was the most 
significant determinant of county-level variation in per pupil budgets. Budgets 
were lower in the black belt and higher in wealthier parishes, but neither coef- 
ficient was  statistically significant. In  1910 it was racial composition and 
wealth that mattered most; both coefficients were large in magnitude and were 
statistically significant. Predominantly black counties had significantly lower 
per pupil budgets, and richer counties spent more per pupil. Thus, after disen- 
franchisement, race and wealth became the dominant determinants of  varia- 
tions in school budgets. Black-belt whites did not need local taxes; they could 
rely on state aid and the police-jury appropriation. In counties with fewer 
blacks to exploit, budgets could be raised, provided the whites in question 
were middle class and interested enough to better their children’s schools. In 
poor counties the white schools fell behind. 
In his report for 1926, the state superintendent of  education published a 
lengthy discussion of educational progress in Louisiana since the turn of the 
century. Page after page recounted the improvements that had been made in 
the white schools: longer school terms; large, modem structures that had re- 
placed one-room buildings; increases in teacher salaries; better-trained teach- 
ers; and a remarkable growth in enrollment in the higher elementary grades 
and in high schools. When the superintendent got to the schools for black 
children, there was much less to say. After displaying a table showing how the 
gap between the average annual salaries of black and white teachers had in- 
creased from $99.00 in 1900 to $600.00 in 1925, the superintendent defended 
the disparity. Black teachers were less qualified, the black schools were open 44  Chapter Three 
fewer months than the white schools, the vast majority of black children at- 
tended the elementary grades, which were cheaper to staff. Why was this the 
case? “The development of the negro schools,” the superintendent explained, 
“has been as rapid . . . as it should have been, for it has been in keeping with 
public sentiment. . . . No institution can be developed very much beyond the 
public opinion on which its success depends” (State of Louisiana 1926,39). 
3.3  Myrdal’s Paradox 
The  disenfranchisement hypothesis  is  straightforward  and  persuasive. 
Stripped of the ballot box, blacks lost a weapon that had previously ensured 
them a claim on school revenues. Even if  blacks had retained the franchise, 
the Louisiana regressions suggest that the black-to-white spending ratio prob- 
ably would have declined after the turn of the century, as the demand for better 
white schools increased. But disenfranchisement  was crucial. Without access 
to the ballot, “appropriations for Negro schools [were] . . .  entirely dependent 
upon the local sentiment of the white school board” (Jones 1917,28). Disen- 
franchisement made “progressivism for middle-class whites”-better  white 
schools-cheaper  to finance. 
The sentiment expressed by Louisiana’s state superintendent was typical. 
Superintendents in black-belt  counties knew that the improvements in the 
white schools had come at the expense of the  black children. “The money 
allocated to the colored children is spent on the education of white children,” 
bragged one local superintendent. “We have twice as many colored children 
of school age as we have white, and we use their money. Colored children are 
mighty profitable to us” (Washburne 1942, 11  1). 
In other counties, improvements in the white public schools did not come 
so cheaply. There, had the question been posed to white middle-class taxpay- 
ers, equalizing the level of expenditures in the black schools to the level pre- 
vailing in the white schools would have been unthinkable. “The colored race,” 
explained one school official, “is only capable of receiving and profiting by an 
elementary education, which costs comparatively much less than that suitable 
for the white race in its more advanced stages of civilization” (US.  Bureau of 
Education 1893, 1075). Racist and self-serving as such statements are, they 
contain a sad grain of truth. School officials kept the black schools open for 
fewer months than white schools because they reasoned that black parents 
would not keep their children in school as long as white parents.13 In cotton 
counties the black schools might not open until after the harvest and many of 
these schools were closed during spring planting season. Black families were 
poorer, on average, than white families. The labor of black children was val- 
uable in agriculture, or at home, or in some other endeavor. This was espe- 
cially true of older children. Only relatively well-off black parents could af- 
ford to send their children to a private high school or to a public one,  if 
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Behind this truth lay another. A well-educated black populace was a threat 
to the social and economic order which placed blacks at the bottom, below 
poor whites. If  blacks had access to good schools, the order might be dis- 
rupted.  “We  must have more money,” shrieked a county superintendent in 
Georgia. “Something is necessarily obliged to be done or the whites will not 
keep up  with  the darkey.”14 The Shreveport, Louisiana Weekly  Caucasian 
stated that black illiteracy was a problem but (oddly) that “education [was] the 
most dangerous remedy for the evil yet proposed. That education is a long 
stride toward social equality no sane man can doubt” (Hair 1969, 127). For 
every white who believed the black public schools were money down the 
drain, others could be found who were surprised by the tremendous sacrifices 
black parents made to send their children to school. “The colored people man- 
ifest a great desire to have their children educated,” marveled a Georgia school 
official. “Their schools are overflowing whenever opened (U.S. Bureau of 
Education 1893, 1079). 
Later I shall demonstrate that there was reason behind the sacrifices of black 
parents (Chapters 6 and 7). Schooling offered blacks a way out of the rural 
South. “The old Negroes,” as one North Carolina school official explained, 
“went earnestly to work to learn to read. They failed . . . but they resolved 
that they would secure education for their children, and with this special end 
in view, the escape from manual labor” (1893,  1080). Cheap, uneducated 
black farm labor helped fuel the prosperity of black-belt whites (Mandle 1978; 
Wright 1986). The labor was cheap because there were few alternatives for 
blacks in black-belt counties. 
At the heartlof the matter lay a conflict between the separate-but-equal doc- 
trine (see Chapter 5)  and the tax burden of segregated schools. Much attention 
has been  devoted to whether  white taxpayers were still subsidizing black 
schools after disenfranchisement (as most whites believed) or whether blacks 
were subsidizing white schools (as many blacks believed). Recent studies 
have not reached a consensus, but none has argued that a subsidy from blacks 
to whites could have been very large in per capita terms (Smith 1973; Kousser 
1980a; Pritchett  1989). But there is no doubt that,  had  the equal part of 
separate-but-equal been a reality and had the increase in expenditures in the 
white schools occurred as it did, a massive subsidy from whites to blacks 
would have been required.  Is According to the letter and spirit of constitutional 
law, the price of de jure segregated schools was supposed to be equal schools, 
but there was little early in the century to compel southern whites to pay the 
price.  l6  Discriminatory funding of black schools persisted because racial in- 
equality enjoyed widespread political, social, and economic support among 
whites, there was little southern blacks could do about it at the polls, and the 
courts were not yet an option. 
Yet, as compelling as the disenfranchisement  hypothesis is, it has a serious 
flaw. Once blacks were disenfranchised, why should a school board in Missis- 
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schools did not disappear after disenfranchisement;  indeed, the black-to-white 
ratio of per pupil spending remained roughly constant from 1910 to 1940, 
when real expenditures per white pupil were increasing (Chapter 2). “The 
great wonder,” Gunnar Myrdal pondered, “is that the principle of the Negroes’ 
right to public education was not renounced altogether. But it did not happen” 
(1944, 888). 
It is important to recognize what Myrdal’s paradox is not about. It is not 
about the elimination of all black schools per se. Black private schools, partic- 
ularly above the elementary grades, were substitutes for public schools. Black 
parents contributed large amounts of  money,  goods, and services to supple- 
ment meager allocations of  public school funds; these additional resources 
were rarely included in official school budgets. The puzzle is why public 
school funds continued to flow to the black population at all. There are several 
partial solutions to Myrdal’s paradox; although each taken separately is inad- 
equate as the sole explanation, together they provide a satisfactory  resolution. 
The first response to Myrdal’s query is his own. However deep the racial 
prejudice, southern whites still believed in the “American Creed.” Access to 
public schools, which provided the means towards upward mobility in the 
American economy, were fundamental to the creed. “The American Creed,” 
Myrdal declared, “showed itself strong enough not to allow the sacred prin- 
ciple of public education [for blacks] to succumb in the South” (1944, 889). 
In evaluating Myrdal’s solution, the issue is not whether southern whites be- 
lieved in  “equal”  schools. The issue is  whether  southern whites believed 
blacks had a “right” to some type of public education.I7  Was adherence to this 
limited fom of the creed really as widespread in  the South as Myrdal as- 
serted? Literary evidence can be found on both sides of this question but, to 
the best of my knowledge, no quantitative surveys of opinion were ever taken. 
It is true, however, that vocal opposition to black elementary schools declined 
as the century progressed, which is consistent with Myrdal’s creed solution. 
But the strongest argument against the creed solution is that it is redundant. 
Even if school officials were not constrained by guilt, there were other incen- 
tives prodding them in the same direction, such as the threat of legal interven- 
tion under the separate-but-equal doctrine. Local officials enjoyed wide lati- 
tude in interpreting the doctrine as they saw fit (or ignoring it altogether), and 
the monetary and nonmonetary costs of bringing suit in cases of alleged vio- 
lations were considerable (Chapter 5).  But an utter violation of the doctrine at 
the elementary school level-a  total elimination of public funding-was  so 
obviously unconstitutional that it is doubtful it would have been tolerated for 
long on a region-wide scale.‘* Not even the state courts of the South, which 
were hardly partial to black causes, would have winked at this sort of denud- 
ing of separate-but-equal.  l9 
Yet  the argument about court pressure must be made with care. The threat 
of  court action created a lower bound under which funding for the black 
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was rising over time, to prevent the racial gap in school quality from becom- 
ing too large (and thus vulnerable to court action) as the white schools im- 
proved. But, whatever the lower bound was, some school boards were spend- 
ing more, because there was considerable spatial variation in  the resources 
devoted to black schools (Jones 1917; Bond  1934; Johnson 1941; Pritchett 
1986). School boards could have reduced expenditures on the black schools 
and used the savings to benefit the white schools  or to cut school taxes, but some 
did not. 
In  addition, there is the Supreme Court case of  Cumming v. Richmond 
County, Georgia in 1899 (see Chapter 5). The Court supported the decision 
of a Georgia school board to shut down a public high school for blacks, osten- 
sibly to ensure adequate funds for black elementary pupils, who were greater 
in number and (from the Court’s perspective) need. In effect, Cumming meant 
that school boards were under no legal obligation to provide black public high 
schools, because such a defense might always be proffered. And, in the im- 
mediate aftermath of Cumming, most school boards did not provide them, as 
Jones’s (1917) study demonstrated. Yet  the number of black high schools in- 
creased steadily after World War One, although Cumming was still (ostensi- 
bly) the legal precedent. 
Contributions by philanthropic foundations are another solution to Myrdal’s 
paradox. Such contributions were made typically on a matching basis, thereby 
stimulating additional expenditure of  state  and  local  funds  on  the  black 
Among the organizations so dedicated, the Rosenwald and Jeanes 
Foundations deserve special recognition.21  The Rosenwald Foundation pro- 
vided millions Qf  dollars to finance the construction of new school buildings 
for black children. The Jeanes Foundation paid for specially trained teachers 
to visit the rural schools, work with teachers to improve the curriculum, and 
generally upgrade the quality of instruction. 
A related solution involves the “bureaucratization”  of southern schools. As 
the century progressed, day-to-day management of  southern public schools 
passed from the hands of  local officials to professional educators, many of 
whom were more liberal than the politicians they replaced (Harris 1985). In 
North Carolina, greater spatial inequality in white expenditures (and greater 
racial disparity) after disenfranchisement  led to demands in some counties for 
increased state control over local school boards. State officials used the oppor- 
tunity to increase their authority and to “coerce local officials into improving 
[the] Negro schools” (Westin 1966, v). State education departments  appointed 
special agents who  served as advocates for greater funding for the black 
schools, as ombudsmen, and as liaisons to the black community and to phil- 
anthropic foundations.  22 
Another answer invokes the potential economic benefits to southern whites 
from a better-educated black labor force (Freeman 1973). White taxpayers 
were willing to foot some of the bill for the black schools as long as the sort 
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ent with reigning beliefs about proper roles for blacks in the Southern econ- 
omy. Literary evidence supporting Freeman’s argument is easy to find. “We 
want [Negroes] to become better cooks, better servants, better washwoman, 
better workmen in field and farm and shop. We  will cheerfully pay taxes to 
give him that sort of schooling” (1973, 35). A white school official stated that 
“those in charge of  negro education do not lose sight of the environment in 
which negroes are required to live and work.” Yet  another explained that “the 
colored people must not lose sight of the fact that manual labor . . . will be 
their lot to a larger degree than that of  the white people. . . . Let them . . . 
show that education does not spoil them as laborers. . .  and all the help they 
need . . . will be extended to them” (U.S. Bureau of Education 1893, 1080). 
Whether blacks should receive an “industrial” versus a “classical” educa- 
tion was debated within the black community. The debate reached its zenith in 
the famous confrontation between Booker T.  Washington and W.  E. B. Du 
Bois. Washington believed it was in the blacks’ best interest to acquiesce to 
segregation in the short run. By learning the manual arts and industrial skills, 
blacks could gradually improve their economic lot, at which point they could 
become a political and social force to be reckoned with. The more radical Du 
Bois  rejected  Washington’s arguments, claiming  that  industrial education 
would merely prepare blacks for a new kind of slavery. 
The issue of industrial education, however, has received more attention in 
the history books than it ever did in real life. Washington’s version of indus- 
trial education included less true industrial training than he claimed (Spivey 
1978). White school officials spoke of the need for industrial education, but 
devoted relatively few resources to it. In retrospect, the reason is clear-there 
was a “free-rider’’  problem. If employers were to support industrial education 
on a grand scale, they would have to be assured there would be some return 
on their investment. In the best of circumstances, the return would be delayed 
into the future when black children entered the labor force. But there was no 
way to prevent the blacks from leaving the region where they had been edu- 
cated. An education was a ticket out of the rural South, and everyone knew it. 
The incentive worked in the opposite direction. By keeping the black schools 
relatively impoverished, much of  the region’s labor force could be  kept at 
home, down on the farm. 
The goal of maintaining a cheap labor force in the long run, however, was 
inconsistent with the goal of attracting labor in the short run. The final reso- 
lution of Myrdal’s paradox is the mobility model (Margo 1990). Black fami- 
lies would leave an area if the provision of  schools for their children were 
seriously threatened. “The white people must not lose sight of the fact,” ex- 
plained one school official, “that it is the labor of a country that makes its 
wealth and that . . . the education . . . of the children of  the laborers is a 
proper charge upon the property of any country. . . . With good schools . . . 
there will be less incentive for the country people to crowd into the cities and 
towns to educate their children” (U.S. Bureau of Education 1893, 1080). Un- 49  The Political Economy of Segregated Schools 
fortunately for employers, the best workers tended to be those who were most 
interested in their children’s schooling. “Already there has been a consider- 
able emigration of the Negroes,” wrote J. W.  Joyner, state superintendent of 
North Carolina’s public schools, less than a decade after blacks had been dis- 
enfranchised in his state: 
There is no surer way to drive the best of them from the state than by keep- 
ing up this continual agitation about withdrawing from them the meager 
educational opportunities that they now  have. Their emigration in large 
numbers would result in a complication of the labor problem. Some of our 
Southern farms would be compelled to lie untenanted and untilled. The 
experience of  one district in Wilson county illustrates this. The county 
school board found it, for various reasons, impossible to purchase a site for 
a Negro school house. Before the year was out the board received several 
offers from farmers in the district to donate a site. Upon inquiry by  the 
chairman of the board as to the reason for these generous offers, he was told 
that when it was learned that no site for the school house could be secured 
and the Negroes were to have no school in that district, at least one-third of 
the best Negro tenants and laborers there moved into other districts where 
they could have the advantages of a school. This is a practical side of this 
question that our people would do well to consider. What happened in this 
district will happen in the entire state if we give the best Negroes reason to 
believe that their public school privileges are to be decreased or withdrawn. 
(1910,54) 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, a “considerable emigration 
of Negroes” took place; Joyner’s fears were confirmed. Later I shall show that 
the  Great  Migiation  drew  its  ranks  disproportionately from  the  better- 
educated segments of the black population (Chapter 7). Black outmigration 
seems to have prompted the following discussion at a school board meeting in 
East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, in 1926: 
That the Negroes are an economic asset would not be challenged. That they 
have been leaving the parish for the past twenty years has clearly been 
shown by the data from the census reports. That they emigrate because of 
meager school conditions cannot be proved, but the consensus of opinion 
among both white and Negro leaders . . . is that one of  the most potent 
influences that can be brought to bear in retaining them is the provision of 
reasonably satisfactory school facilities. . . . The parish must provide bet- 
ter schools and longer terms or the exodus of Negroes will continue, per- 
haps at an increasing rate. (Foote and Robertson 1926, 20-21) 
The loss of black labor was not the only loss in this parish. “The continued 
residence of the Negro population has an important bearing on the school 
revenues, because the Negro educables now  bring into the parish from the 
state school fund $20,000 more than is now expended for Negro education” 
(1926, 21). 
Meetings like the one in East Feliciana parish took place throughout the 50  Chapter Three 
South after the  onset of  the  Great Migration, and  similar opinions were 
voiced. The initial improvements in the black schools, in the form of longer 
school years and the provision of high schools, occurred in the 1920s, once 
the permanent nature of the migration became clear. Some firms went so far 
as to supplement expenditures in the black schools to attract (or keep) a high 
quality, stable workforce (Bond 1939; Fishback 1989). 
Black mobility was a threat in the case of the elementary schools, because 
the school districts numbered in the thousands, were geographically small, 
and were dispersed over a large area. School boards might have “colluded” by 
forming one  gigantic governmental unit-an  educational cartel-but  the 
usual difficulties of enforcing collusive arrangements  when the number of par- 
ticipants was large would have offset any gains from an even lower level of 
expenditures on the black schools. Collusion would have been difficult across 
state lines and impossible across the Mason-Dixon line. 
When the efficient scale of public funding was large relative to the spatial 
dispersion of the black population and its per capita demand for education, 
and when the private sector responded to some extent (as was the case with 
higher education), the threat of exit was a feeble weapon. The loss of the small 
number of blacks who left the South to go to law school, for example, did no 
damage to the southern economy. It was far cheaper to provide out-of-state 
scholarships to black students rather than open separate-but-equal facilities 
(Tushnet 1987). Exit, in other words, was no substitute for political voice and 
adherence to the equal clause of the separate-but-equal  doctrine. 
Thus,  despite the  impact of  disenfranchisement, the “supply curve” of 
black public schools was not fixed and unchanging, unresponsive to “market 
forces  .” Successive generations of  black parents, better educated than previ- 
ous generations, desired more and better public schools for their children- 
and the system responded, albeit slowly and grudgingly. 
In some states, especially in the Upper South, the various institutions and 
incentives that make up the solution to Myrdal’s paradox were sufficient to 
cause the black-to-white spending ratio to begin a slight upward trend after 
World War One (see Tables 2.5-2.7).  But, in the region as a whole, the insti- 
tutions and incentives were not enough to force an equalization of  school ex- 
penditures. Pressure for equalization finally came from a conjunction of long- 
term trends, forces outside the South, and events beyond the region’s control. 
In the 1920s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) began a concerted legal campaign to end educational discrimina- 
tion in southern schools (Tushnet 1987). In the early 1930s, poor economic 
conditions forced cutbacks in public school funds in the South, and the black 
schools bore the brunt of the decline (Westin 1966; Vack, Lowe, and Hansot 
1984). Frustrated by the lack of progress and by the reductions, blacks be- 
came increasingly willing to turn to the courts. The initial court battles, fo- 
cussing on desegregation of higher education and the elimination of separate 
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early  1940s (Kluger 1977; Tushnet 1987; Chapter 4). In addition, periodic 
monitoring of the black schools by the U.S. Office of Education; the various 
studies by black scholars such as Du Bois, Horace Mann Bond, Charles John- 
son, and others; and GUMN  Myrdal’s  An American Dilemma were instrumen- 
tal in  disseminating information about conditions in southern schools to a 
wide audience. During World  War Two the “dilemma” of race relations, in- 
cluding educational discrimination, became a subject of national (and federal) 
concern (Vatter 1985). By the late 1940s, when it became clear that the legal 
tide and public opinion were turning against it, the South responded by paying 
closer attention to the equal part of separate-but-equal, fearing the loss of the 
separate part (Black and Black 1987). But by then it was too late: the NAACP 
had  switched  to  a  different  strategy-&  jure  segregation was  morally 
wrong-a  strategy that would culminate successfully in Brown  v. Board of 
Education in 1954. 
3.4  Summary 
In the late nineteenth century the black-to-white ratio of per pupil expendi- 
tures in southern public schools declined as a consequence  of black disenfran- 
chisement and growing demand for better white schools. Although public 
school funds continued to flow to the black population after disenfranchise- 
ment, the forces that ensured the flow would continue were poor substitutes 
for voting rights and enforcement of the law. Ultimately it took political weap- 
ons (the NAACP, the courts, and public opinion) to fight an injustice that was 
caused by political upheaval in the first place. 
I have focussed in this chapter on racial differences in per pupil expendi- 
tures. Chapter 2 suggested, however, that racial differences in wages paid to 
teachers were an important proximate cause of racial differences in per pupil 
expenditures. To complete my analysis of the political economy of segregated 
schools, the next chapter examines the determinants of racial differences in 
teacher salaries. 